I
The desirability of calling a conference to overcome the obvious defects of the Charter may appear self-evident. Yet the real question is not the need for refonn-which is indisputable-but the advisability of attempting refonn at a General Conference called specifically for this purpose. Before coming to a final decision on this point, it is first necessary to assess the prospects of actually achieving refonn at such a conference and, also, the possibilities of securing the required changes in other ways.
It must be admitted that the amendment procedure under the Charter is a formidable obstacle to its revision. Proposals must first be adopted by a two-thirds vote in either the General Assembly or a General Conference, and then be ratified by two-thirds of the Member States including all the permanent members of the Security Council. This means that the Western Big Three, the Soviet Union, and the island of Formosa all have a veto. In view of this, it is improbable that any amendments can be adopted in the near future. Whether or not it is impossible depends on the scope of the refonns contemplated. Four possibilities exist.
First, a "punctuation" conference' might be held for the limited purpose of securing minor drafting changes. Such a conference might succeed, though the task would still not be easy. Even the most innocent proposals for technical drafting changes are frequently found on examination to involve substantive issues. It is doubtful, however, whether the convening of a full-scale international conference solely for the purpose of dealing with such trivialities could be justified. It would seem more appropriate to ask the General Assembly to deal with such problems.
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A second possibility is a conference called with the intention of radically reforming the present Charter in the direction of world government, or something like it. It can be said with absolute certainty that sucb a conference would be doomed to failure. Even if Soviet hostility were circumvented, for example, by driving Russia out of the United Nations, there is no indication that the Western nations would be prepared to take any real steps in the direction of world government in the immediate future.
Thirdly, the conference could seek important but not fundamental changes. At the moment, even to hope for this is wishful thinking, but next year, or several years from now, the world situation might be different. Finally, a conference could be held for the purpose of reviewing the Charter, but not necessarily revising it. The United States is advocating this alternative.
It should be realized that if a General Conference is held, it will not begin where the San Francisco Conference left off. It will not be simply a case of gaining what we failed to secure in 1945. This is impossible because of changes in the world political situation in the intervening years--particularly the breakdown of great-power unity and the extension of the "franchise" in the UN to a large number of newly independent, militarily weak, and economically underdeveloped countries. New states have been created at the rate of one a year since the end of the war, and many more countries are on the threshold of nationhood .
It should not be assumed that a revised Charter will necessarily be better, at least from a Canadian point of view. Indeed, the cbanges which are most likely to be brought about are precisely those whicb will have least appeal to us. The plain fact is that the Soviet Union may find it easier than the Western nations to secure the adoption of its proposals for revision. The reason for this is that the "neutral" nations in the cold war-and they hold the balance of power in the UN-are, on the issue of Charter reform, more in sympathy with the Soviet Union than with the West. Furthermore, the Russians would not hesitate to exercise a veto if faced with a hostile majority, whereas the Western powers in a similar position would do so only with the greatest reluctance. In this respect, we are victims of our own propaganda ; having condemned the Soviet abuse and even use of the veto, it would seem almost immoral to exercise it except in defence of our most vital national interests. Besides, we are far more sensitive to world public opinion than the Soviet bloc, and consequently more willing to accept compromises. There is, therefore, a very real danger that the only type of reform which is possible will be unpalatable to us.
The second consideration to be borne in mind in assessing the desirability of calling a special conference for the formal amendment of the Charter, is the extent to which the Charter can be changed informally. A comparison between the Charter drafted in 1945 and the Charter as it operates today reveals that radical revision has already taken place. Despite, and perhaps because of, the rigid procedure for formal amendment, elasticity has had to be provided in other ways. Certainly, the United Nations Charter has proven to be far more flexible than is generally assumed. The words of the Charter have not been altered but their meaning in many cases has. Professor Morgenthau has even claimed that "the new United Nations as it actually operates bears hardly any resemblance to the philosophy and intentions of the Charter.'" This development has come about in three main ways: through amplification, through interpretation, and through desuetude.
The Charter has been amplified or supplemented both by international agreements among Members and by resolutions of UN organs. Important examples which could be cited are the Declaration of Human Rights, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the rules of procedure drawn up by the various UN organs, the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
More important are the changes which have been brought about through interpretation. The Charter provides no authoritative method of interpretation, although advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice are certainly important. A particularly significant example was the Court· 's reassertion, in 1949, of the doctrine of implied powers.' But such opinions are neither compulsory nor binding. As a resuit, each Member State and each organ is, in general, free to operate the Charter as it sees fit' Interpretations of this kind produce precedents, and precedents result in rules which, though not legally binding, do have the powerful sanction of usage. The growth of these unwritten rules has frustrated many of the fundamental intentions of tbe founders. This is the principal explanation of the radical transformation which has taken place in the Charter.
An excellent example is found in the practice of considering an abstention on the part of a permanent member of the Security Council as constituting a "concurring" vote rather than a veto. It is interesting to note that Russia was the abstaining power in twentysix of the twenty-nine cases where abstention occurred in the first four years of the UN; and that at no time has she considered the resolutions adopted as invalid or illegal, despite the plain meaning of the Charter. Article 27 (3 ) states that "decisions of the Security Council ... shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."
Another instance is the extensive interpretation given by Mr. Trygvie Lie of his own powers under Article 99 to take the initiative in political matters; this has greatly altered the nature of the office of Secretary General. Mention should also be made of the great expansion in the functions of the General Assembly. At San Francisco, the smaller powers including Canada tried without much success to enhance the importance of the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council. But today the rule of the General Assembly in the political and security sphere is far greater than was contemplated under the modest proposals of 1945. In fact, the General Assembly has largely superseded and indeed eclipsed the Security Council in the handling of political disputes.
The same trend is evident in another field. The Charter makes a sharp distinction between trust territories, which are subject to international administration and supervision, and non-self-governing territories which are not. In the case of the latter, the colonial powers were required under Article 73 (e) merely to transmit reports on non-political conditions in their territories "for information purposes." Today, however, the distinction has been blurred, and the UN is exercising an increasing degree of supervision over all colonial territories even in political matters. This is an example of the increasing tendency to interpret narrowly the ill-defined sphere of domestic juriSdiction.
Parts of the Charter have alsc withered away, either because they have been ignored or because they have not been carried out as originally intended. The outstanding example is the Security Council. Non-permanent membership has certainly not been determined "in the first instance" (Article 23 (1)) on a functional basis as Canada had hoped. As already mentioned, the Security Council no longer has, and indeed probably never did have, the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" which UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO Q UARTERLY the Charter assigns to it (Article 24 ( 1)). Not a single "special agreement" has been concluded governing "numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided" to the United Nations, even though these agreements were to be negotiated "as soon as possible" (Article 43). The requirement that "Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action" (Article 45) is likewise only a dream. Needless to say, the Military Staff Committee has not been called upon to assume "the strategic direction" of the UN armed forces provided for under Article 27 (3). Perhaps the decline in the power and prestige of the Security Council can be shown most dramatically by the fact that the number of Council sessions has fallen from a peak of 171 in 1948 to an average of 40 per year since 1951. In 1945, it was expected that the Council would function continuously (Article 28 (1)). Yet, in 1953, apart from the six private sessions devoted to choosing a new Secretary General, it did not meet at all until well into August. Almost all political issues are now handled by the General Assembly rather than the Security Council; consequently, the veto has become a rarity.
In view of the bleak prospects for achieving any sort of satisfactory revision of the Charter and the relative ease with which the Charter has developed through informal change, is there any point in considering the convening of a review conference? Some people might contend that such a conference would have great propaganda value if the Russians could be shown to be intransigent and reactionary. But apart from the fact that it would be far easier for the Russians to make life uncomfortable for the West than vice versa, there is always the danger that they might seize the occasion to withdraw from the UN; and this would be nothing short of disastrous. Admittedly, it would be of great educational value if, as proposed by the United States government, "a great debate" on the fundamentals of the Charter were to take place, but this is scarcely likely. A bitter clash between East and West over the terms of the Charter is more likely to weaken than strengthen, let alone reform it, especially if it concentrates world attention on its imperfections and results in imp atience and disillusionment. As Sir Gladwyn J ebb said recently: "The really important thing, I believe, is not so much that the United Nations should be reformed or even tidied up--excellent though that operation would be in itself-but simply that it sbould continue.'" 5"The British Commonwealth, the United States of America and the United Nations," speech at Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore. M aryland, January 13, 1954, Remarks of Sir Gladwyn quoted below are also taken from this speech.
My own opinion is that a review conference should not be held unless the chances of achieving modest improvements are considerably more promising than at present. This does not mean, however, that no preparations should be made until it is decided whether the conference is to be held. The first steps in this direction have in fact already been taken by the UN,· by several governments including the Canadian government, and by numerous private organizations. Besides, there is every indication at present tbat a review conference will be held in 1956, even if tbe Soviet bloc boycotts it. It is, therefore, important to discuss the specific proposals which are likely to be advanced at that time.
II
Proposals for reform of the United Nations Charter may be considered to fall into two main categories: those concerned with functions and powers and those dealing with organization. The question of UN functions and powers is itself twofold. First, there is the problem of scope or competence, and secondly, the nature of the powers.
The question of competence is analogous to that of provincial autonomy in Canada; it is the question of defining the distribution of powers between two levels of government. Although the stated purposes of the UN are most comprehensive, the scope of its authority is not unlimited. According to Article 2(7), "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" except in the case of enforcement action. But, as has already been suggested, the Charter provides no machinery for judicial or even political review, and as a result widely differing interpretations can and have been given to this crucial clause. This is inevitable, not only because the terms Hintervene~' and "domestic jurisdiction" are in themselves ambiguous, but also because the UN cannot possibly avoid encroaching on domestic affairs if it is to carry out the functions assigned to it. It is almost as if policemen were called on to keep order without making arrests, or governments to spend money without raising it.
There are three general points of view on this issue. Some UN members consider, for example, that the mere mention in Article 55 (c ) of the Charter that "the United Nations shall promote: ...
[the] observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms," is evidence that the whole field of human rights was not regarded by the founders as "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." For us in Canada, this would be a revolutionary doctrine for we are still debating whether human rights is a federal or a provincial matter. Other Member States, mainly countries like the Union of South Africa and France whose policies have been the object of widespread criticism, have been staunch defenders of what we would call "provincial rights." An intermediate group of states, Canada included, has tried to straddle the fence by maintaining, for example, that while South Africa's treatment of her own people is a matter of domestic concern, discllssion of the issue does not constitute intervention within the meaning of the Charter.
The review conference ought to clarify this confusing and explosive issue by stating more precisely what limits are to he placed on the competence of the UN. There is also a need to provide machinery, preferably judicial machinery, to settle authoritatively the differences of opinion which will inevitably arise regardless of what "final" definition of domestic jurisdiction is adopted. The basic difficulty is not so much that present encroachments in the internal affairs of Member States are so objectionable, but that if the recent trend continues---and there is every indication that it will-the concept of a sphere of domestic jurisdiction will soon have no real meaning. This is why so many states are as concerned about erosions of national autonomy as Mr. Duplessis is with alleged encroachments on the jurisdiction of the province of Quebec. A further difficulty is that UN "interventions" have been almost entirely at the expense of the Western powers. Were the UN to pay more attention to internal affairs in, say, Egypt, Poland, or Columbia, the present situation would be fairer. (The recent loL.O. report on Forced Labour, with its searching analysis of labour conditions behind the Iron Curtain, is a promising beginning.) The Western nations must, however, realize that, whether they like it or not, the concept of domestic jurisdiction as it existed in the past is no longer acceptable to the vast majority of the world's people. Concessions on this point are part of the price that must be paid if the West is to come to terms with the revolutionary forces at work in the world today. Compromise, however painful, may well be necessary as the price of survival.
Once the scope of UN functions has been settled, there is the question of its powers. The present position is that, in general, the UN can only discuss, report, and recommend. Its resolutions have no binding effect on states, except in the case of the Security Council which was provided with both teeth and the power to bite. UN Members took the unprecedented step of agreeing in advance to carry out its decisions (Article 25). The extensive use of the veto has, however, effectively muzzled the Security Council; and, during its brief period of activity, it displayed little evidence of bark and none of bite. Thus, the one real threat in the Charter to the sovereign independence of UN Members has been successfully eliminated.
The inability of the UN to enforce its decisions is the central weakness of the Charter in the view of advocates of world governmentwho presumably include almost everyone to a greater or less extent. The great need is to give the UN "powers which, however limited, are nevertheless real." The General Assembly, it is said, should become a Parliament of Man capable of enacting legislation which is legally binding without the need for subsequent ratification by national governments. This analysis is perfectly sound; the only difficulty is that, in terms of 1956, it can only be regarded as visionary. And any attempt to revise the Charter in this direction might conceivably cause more harm than good.
My own view is that a world state is unlikely to result from such frontal attacks. More hopeful is the possibility that states will increasingly agree in advance to accept as binding specific UN recommendations, as the Big Four did in connection with the disposal of the former Italian colonies.
1 Furthermore, UN resolutions, which at present have only the moral sanction of world public opinion, may in time, by general consent or possibly even with judicial support, be considered to have legal force. It is encouraging to recall that this is the way the common law emerged, though less encouraging to remember that this development encompassed several centuries.
The most appropriate form of organization for the United Nations cannot, of course, be determined until its powers are defined. But even if no modifications are made in the present powers of the UN, certain structural changes will no doubt be considered, with the dual purpose of perfecting the organization of the UN as it is now constituted, and of clearing away certain organizational obstacles to its future development.
A basic weakness underlying the present organization of the UN and hindering its development is the first and fundamental principle of the Charter, the equality of all Members of the UN (Article 2 ( I ) ). Such a principle flies in the face of one of the most obvious facts of the modern world-the enormous and increasing inequality of states as regards military and political power, size and wealth, levels of literacy and culture, etc. Any organization which refuses to face up to these facts is being dangerously unrealistic.
Mr. Mackenzie King anticipated this problem when, in 1943, he enunciated the functional principle. He recognized that if all states were to be given an "equal voice in international decisions, no effective decisions are likely to be taken" -and the experience of the past ten years has shown how right Mr. King was. The solution is to give each state a role in the UN corresponding to its role in the world. Power and responsibility must be correlated.
The attempts of the framers of the Charter to meet this problem have not been conspicuously successful. The first device used, the veto, is subject to two objections. It is too crude a form of weighted voting, and it is too comprehensive. No doubt, the veto will come up for discussion at the proposed review conference and some reform is possible, thougb unlikely. Certainly abolition is inconceivable, and possibly even undesirable, without some alternative system of weighted voting. As Sir Gladwyn Jebb said recently, "The 'principle of the veto' is not only desirable if the UN is to continue to exist but is also inevitable." The only alternative is world government, and at present that really is not an alternative. Some further attempts may be made to bypass the veto as part of the general trend towards ignoring the Security Council and enhancing the position of the General Assembly, but these will merely aggravate the problem which the veto was intended to solve, the real inequalities among member states.
The most hopeful prospect is for a whittling down of the number of issues to which the veto applies. The Soviet Union might conceivably consent to surrender its veto over applications for membership in the UN, if Western nations were willing to amend or ignore the Charter provisions as far as the admission of Soviet satellites is concerned. This is a real possibility as many states--the United States apparently being an exception-feel that the UN should be as universal as possible. (It would be an even greater advance if the conference agreed to tbe automatic admission of all states, whether "peace-loving" or not, particularly if it also decided to refer disputes as to whether or not an applicant were a "state" to the International Court of Justice for settlement. ) Suggestions have also been made that the veto should not apply to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the selection of a Secretary General, and decisions as to whether the veto applies or not (the "double veto" ); but little progress can be expected in these directions. In 1948 the United States Senate approved the surrender of the veto over most of these questions, but Russia's attitude is quite unchanged.
The second device introduced into the Charter was the principle of functional representation on UN councils (Articles 23 (1), 44, 86 (1)). That is, each council was to be composed of a small number of states which had substantial contributions to make to the work of that council. This functional principle, hailed in 1945 as a great advance in the evolution of international institutions, has turned out to be almost a dead letter. Part of the explanation is the decline in importance of UN councils, especially the Security Council; but the persistent refusal of Member States to act in accordance with the functional principle when electing council members is the principal explanation. Equitable geographical representation and a desire to "share the honours" have in practice been the dominant considerations in allocating Council seats. The assignment of only one nonpermanent seat on the Security Council to the Commonwealth has been particularly indefensible.
Although the intentions of the framers at San Francisco have on the whole been frustrated, the need to relate power in the UN to world responsibilities outside the UN is as important now as it was then-and indeed more important. A number of new and small states have joined since San Francisco, and many more applications are awaiting Security Council approval. Recent technological changes have greatly increased the gap between the super-atomic powers and the twopenny-halfpenny banana republics. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly evident that there is no real prospect of strengthening the UN while the preposterous principle of state equality remains. Mr. John Foster Dulles, in deploring the fact that the General Assembly was permitted only to "recommend," stated the obvious truth when he said that "the Assembly voting procedure, with one vote per nation, precludes its decisions having more than advisory weight."· Majorities under such a system are often not only unrepresentative but also irresponsible. This is the key organizational issue in the UN. Little progress is likely to be made until an acceptable system of weighted voting is adopted.
Here the important word is "acceptable." No "political" international organization has yet even seriously considered the problem, though a number of specialized organizations like the International Wheat Council, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Schuman Plan Assembly are using functional voting systems. The difficulty is not so much that the principle is unreasonable but that agreement on the basis on which votes are to be weighted is difficult to secure. The ideal is a system which is simpie, fair, and automatic.
Two main approaches are possible. In the first place, a formula could be drawn up and an independent commission established to work out the scale of votes on the basis of statistical evidence made available to it. An alternative method is to group states into classes with each class being given say 1, 2, 3, or 5 votes. In this case, the General Assembly would presumably decide which states are to fall into each category. The present system which, in effect, gives the Soviet Union three votes in the UN (and also the offer in 1945 of three votes to the United States) is an example of a crude attempt at an ad hoc scheme of weighted voting.
Whatever system is used, some decision must be made concerning the basic factors which are to be weighted. Weighting votes in proportion to population would be a straightforward, objective, and obvious solution, but population is not the only consideration in determining the importance of a state. As Mr. Pearson has said: "The criterion of population alone ... would certainly not do, because it is often in conflict with such tests as economic resources and development, trade and commercial importance, or military strength."· The difficulty is that an attempt by Western nations to emphasize these factors at the expense of population figures is bound to appear to the heavily populated, under-developed areas of the world as a cynical attempt at discrimination.
It will also be necessary to decide on the proper ratio between the number of votes assigned to the greatest and to the smallest states. The greater the weighting, the more inclined the major powers will be to accept weighted voting as a substitute for the veto. On the other hand, a wide spread between the maximum and minimum number of votes will lose the support of the smaller states, which is also essential to the acceptance of a system. It is clear that working out a scheme of functional voting is going to make the task of redistributing parliamentary seats seem simple.
Fortunately, there are certain ways in which the task might be made easier. Weighted voting might be adopted for certain purposes only, such as resolutions on financial measures or on the settlements of disputes; or different formulae might be adopted for different purposes. Another possibility i. the introduction of a double voting system; Mr. John Foster Dulles has suggested that General Assembly resolutions might be passed by a "combination vote" -"a majority of all the Members, on the basis of sovereign equality, and also a majority vote, on a weighted basis, which takes into account population, resources, etc."'o The most logical suggestion so far put forward is to relate voting power to financial or military contributions to the UN. Under such a system, Member States would be both encouraged to support the UN and discouraged from asking for too many votes.
Although the reorganization of the UN on a basis which reflects more realistically the true state of the world is the most pressing and most fundamental organizational problem facing the UN, other problems will undoubtedly be raised at any review conference. Suggestions will certainly be made for the revamping of UN machinery for collective security. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950, important as it is, falls far short of the needs of the situation. Sir Gladwyn J ebb has gone so far as to suggest recently that "it is useless to think that the United Nations, as at present constituted, provides us with any real collective security." The prospect of resurrecting the Security Council and related paraphenalia is not too encouraging, but some progress towards the formation of an international force is at least conceivable, particularly if weighted voting were to become a reality. The extension of the machinery of the Peace Observation Commission is also possible, and obviously desirable. The institution of a regular practice of stationing UN missions in areas of potential conflict, such as Thailand, instead of confining them to points of actual conflict, would be a significant advance.
The non-political machinery of the UN is even more likely to be reviewed. Mr. Pearson has reminded us that "it would be foolish to forget that for most of the so-called 'under-developed' nations of the world, it is precisely in the social and economic articles of the UN Charter that they see the main appeal and the greatest value in international co-operation."ll Hence we can anticipate strong pressure for international machinery to deal with the distribution of raw materials, the financing of economic development, and the enforcement of human rights.
Finally, the machinery of the Trusteeship Council, and particularly the Special Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, is bound to be strengthened. though formal amendment of the Charter is not the only way of bringing it about.
III
In approaching the question of revision of the United Nations Charter, it is important that exaggerated hopes for substantial refoITIls should not be raised. Nor should Charter revision be regarded as the answer to all the world's problems, or even to all the difficulties of the UN. Mr. Paul Martin made this point when he said, "I do not think anyone of us believes that Charter revision is a panacea for the deep-rooted ills of international life."l2 FurtheITIlore, we should be acutely conscious of the dangers of tinkering with such a delicate and explosive mechanism as the Charter. The possibility of getting badly burned is very real; and we may even find the whole UN blowing up in our faces. This does not mean that no consideration should now be given to the problem. On the contrary, the right sort of preparation is essential if the question of revision is to be viewed in its proper perspective.
What refoITIls, if any, will be adopted in 1956 depends very largely on the precise world political situation-international and domesticat the time. Our best policy for the present is to prepare for every eventuality, but at the same time to concentrate attention on the fundamental issues, particularly domestic jurisdiction and weighted voting. It is important, too, that only skilled surgeons should be allowed to operate on the Charter. If none is available, or if the diagnoses conflict, then we ought to play safe and apply only first aid.
